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This paper addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international organizations cease to 
exist. International relations literature offers rich explanations for the creation, design and effectiveness 
of international institutions and organizations, but surprisingly little effort has gone into studying the 
dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand why and under what conditions international 
organizations endure, we must also explain why they often fail to do so. The present paper formulates 
and tests theoretical conjectures about IO termination using a combination of statistical analysis and 
historical case studies. My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815-2016. I find 
that exogenous shocks is a leading proximate cause of  IO deaths since 1815 but that international 
organizations that are well-established, have large memberships and technical mandates have higher 
survival rates. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of refinements to existing theories institutional 
robustness. 
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 1 
On 14 November 1936, Germany withdrew from the international conventions establishing the 
International Commissions of the Danube, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Central Commission for 
Navigation of the Rhine.1 Whilst they were never officially dissolved, the Elbe, Oder and Danube River 
Commissions never resumed their functions, whereas the Rhine Commission continues its operation to 
this day, making it the oldest international organization (IO) in modern history. On 31 March 1991, 
members of the Warsaw Pact voted to terminate their alliance in view of monumental 
geopolitical changes. The Pact thus joined long list of institutionalized multilateral alliances that have 
been eventually relegated to history.2 By contrast, its western counterpart, NATO, went on to expand its 
membership and mission, leading international relations (IR) scholars from various theoretical 
perspectives to hail it as an exemplar of the remarkable durability of international institutions (e.g., 
McCalla 1996; Wallander 2000; Menon and Welsh 2011). 
Why do IOs (sometimes) die? Why some IOs and not others? From the perspective of existing 
scholarly literature, IO terminations present a puzzle. An extensive literature in IR asserts that 
international institutions and organizations arise from costly negotiation and contracting processes that 
are far too deeply ingrained in underlying social and political structures to simply reverse (Cotrell 
2016:21; Strange 1998). Rational choice theories invoke high negotiating costs and ‘increasing returns’ 
from institutionalized cooperation to ground the notion that states will seek to maintain existing 
institutions as long as feasible and—at any rate—“long after the original conditions for their creation 
have disappeared” (Keohane 1984:215; Stein 1990:50). Sociological institutionalists highlight 
normative and cognitive biases leading to ‘competency traps’ (March and Olsen 1998:964) and 
institutional status quo bias (Crawford 2002:109; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001), historical 
institutionalists cite positive feedback and lock-in effects producing path-dependence (North 1990:95; 
Pierson 2004), while organizational theorists highlight international secretariats’ strategic use of 
bureaucratic resources to resist obsolescence (Shanks et al. 1996:593; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). 
While they depart from vastly different theoretical assumptions, what these perspectives have in 
common is a general expectation that institutional change is predominantly incremental and institutional 
death rare (Cappoccio and Kelemen 2007; Cotrell 2016:21; North 1990:89-94). As Shanks and co-
authors (1996:593) summarize, “no-body expects public institutions to die.” 
IOs do of course die. Of 561 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) created between 1815-2006, 
216 (about two-fifths) have since ceased to exist (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). Why, given the high costs 
of creating international institutions and the lasting benefits they produce, do states often abandon 
established IOs? Under what conditions are IOs most likely to terminate? Existing scholarship provides 
surprisingly limited analytical leverage on these questions. For decades, IR scholars have focused on 
explaining patterns of institutional creation and design, and on theorizing the underpinnings of 
institutional robustness—understood broadly as “the ability of international institutions to endure 
despite exogenous change” (Hasenclever et al. 1992:2).3 This lopsided focus on explicating institutional 
endurance (rather than termination) has led to widespread selection bias, insofar as scholars have 
systematically favoured the study of the living over the dead.4 Thus, many studies of institutional 
                                                     
1 German Waterways, Treaty Denunciation, 1936. 
2 Inter alia, Brussels Treaty Organization, 1948-1954; South East Asian Treaty Organization, 1954-1977; Australia, New 
Zeeland, United States Security Treaty, 1951-1984; Central Treaty Organization, 1955-1979, and Western European Union, 
1954-2011. 
3 Notable exceptions include Shanks et al. (1996) who analyse causes of decline in the IGO population from 1982-1991, 
Abbott et al. (2016) who draw on ecological theory to explain how changing environmental conditions have facilitated the 
rise of private transnational regulatory organizations at the expense of IGOs, and Gray (2018) who analyses variation in 
the vitality of regional economic organizations. 
4 The widespread tendency to study surviving IOs is partly determined by prior theoretical assumptions, but an element of 
optical fallacy may also be at work: because enduring IOs endure, they are easier to identify and analyse than their deceased 
counterparts, leading to systematic bias in favour of studying IGOs that survive exogenous shock or internal contestation 
rather than those that succumb. 
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‘robustness’ focus rather one-sidedly on a handful of enduring IOs while ignoring prominent 
organizational failures. For example, the substantial literature focus on explaining NATO’s survival and 
expansion after the Cold War (e.g., Wallander 2000; McCalla 1996; Menon and Welsh 2011. cf. Lake 
2001) contains surprisingly few references—let alone focused comparison—to former institutionalized 
alliances that dissolved once exogenous threats subsided. This bias, I submit, has led scholars to widely 
overestimate institutional robustness and to overlook processes that lead to institutional termination. On 
the flipside, the comparatively sparse literature on institutional collapse has tended to focus on individual 
cases (Bernholz 2009), or has centred on select segments of the population (Cotrell 2016; Panke and 
Peterson 2011; Shanks et al. 1996; Gray 20185). Limited by functional specificities and historical 
contingency, such studies fail to offer a general explanation of institutional death that can account for 
mortality patterns across a wider universe of cases. 
This article attempts to fill this gap by providing a theory-based analysis of organizational death 
across the population of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) since 1815. It builds on and extends 
earlier statistical analysis of IGO death by formulating and testing a number of specific theoretical 
conjectures, and by supplementing population-wide analysis with detailed case studies of IGO 
terminations during specific historical ‘stress periods’ or ‘critical junctures.’ Previous research has 
established that IGO terminations correlate strongly with geopolitical shocks and with certain 
institutional traits such as small size and young age (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). Yet, without 
understanding how these factors influence institutional demise in specific cases, we are no closer to 
comprehending what causes IGO termination v. endurance. My ambition in this article is thus to 
distinguish various factors and processes that determine IGO death, to identify the circumstances under 
which such processes are likely to occur, and to establish how they unfold in specific cases. 
I begin with a brief discussion of the central concepts relevant to this study. Next I outline broad 
historical patterns of IGO mortality to motivate my research question(s), and to identify historical 
periods and organizational aspects of particular interest. In the third section I turn to leading 
institutionalist theories to derive hypotheses about the causes of IGO termination. Section 4 turns to 
fine-grained empirical analysis, combining medium-n statistical analysis with individual case studies. I 
conclude by discussing the implications of my analysis for existing institutional theories. 
Data and Methods 
My analysis is based on an expanded version of the Dead-IGO (DIGO) dataset, which contains 
information on all IGOs created between 1815-2006, tracking their fate until 2016. This dataset includes 
IGOs listed in the Correlates of War (COW) IGO-Datasets (version 2.3) plus an additional 36 IGOs that 
are not included in the COW. In addition to listing the fate of individual IGOs (‘defunct’ or ‘operational’) 
as of 2016, the dataset codes core institutional features including number of state parties, scope of 
mandate and centralization,6 along with factors of organizational age and geographic location. (a 
detailed explanation of coding criteria is in the codebook). 
My empirical analysis combines population-wide statistical analysis and case study. Starting with 
population-wide analysis is necessary for two reasons. First, it is possible that terminations may be 
driven by different antecedent conditions in different segments of the IGO population. Yet without first 
observing variation across the whole population, we cannot know what the relevant segments might be. 
Second, population-wide analysis can identify broad regularities which may serve as a source of 
hypothesis development. Single or small-n studies of IGO death—while useful in recognizing an 
important phenomenon—have distinct liabilities when used as a source of development of concepts and 
                                                     
5 Gray’s 2018 study of the vitality of regional economic organizations provides the most comprehensive analysis of 
robustness/frailty in a larger segment of the IGO-population. 
6 My measure of centralization is based on data from Westerwinter and Reinsberg (2019) who code the presence of dispute 
settlement, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for the universe of IGOs. 
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hypotheses about variation in IGO mortality. As Pierson notes (2004:141), reliance on single cases often 
leads scholars to focus on immediate sources of institutional change—the ‘catalysts’—but have a harder 
time identifying the role of underlying structural factors. Because they present isolated studies of 
institutional collapse at particular points in time, we cannot be certain what factors are important in 
generating the observed outcomes (opcit.; Baum and Shipilov 2006). For these reasons, I begin with a 
population-wide statistical survey to ground my formulation of hypotheses before proceeding to test 
individual theoretical conjectures through a combination of medium-n statistical analysis and detailed 
case-studies designed to establish whether particular causal mechanisms are present in specific cases 
and produce the expected outcome(s). 
Theoretical contribution 
My analysis contributes to several avenues of research on international institutions and -organizations. 
First, by moving the study of institutional collapse beyond the study of single cases of dissolved IGOs, 
I seek to advance our empirical and theoretical understanding of when and how international institutions 
die. In doing so, I also seek to refine previous theoretical understandings of what allows some IGOs to 
endure. As discussed, studies of institutional robustness have predominantly focused on highly robust 
international organizations. We are, however, unlikely to discover the factors underpinning 
organizational robustness by examining only enduring organizations. Long-lived IGOs may share 
certain features, but without carefully examining organizations that did not last, we cannot know whether 
and how they differed. Bringing to light data on dead IGOs thus enables us to test the validity of existing 
theories of institutional robustness against a larger array of cases, and to generate new hypotheses about 
what accounts for the remarkable endurance of some international organizations. 
Key Concepts 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly clarify the unit of analysis and thus delimit the universe of 
cases. The international institutions that are the focus of this study are formal intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) established by charter or international treaty—as opposed to looser collections of 
unwritten rules, norms or conventions. To qualify as an IGO an organization must have a written charter, 
at least three sovereign contracting parties, and an independent administrative apparatus in the form of 
a permanent secretariat or staff (Pevehouse et al. 2004).7 
The termination of formal IGOs must be clearly distinguished from situations in which deeply 
embedded informal norms and practices lose their prescriptive status. Such cases have been the focus of 
previous studies of how norm-contestation and de-legitimation may trigger institutional change (Panke 
and Peterson 2011; Cotrell 2009, 2016). I limit my analysis to formal IGOs for both conceptual and 
theoretical reasons. First, unlike informal international institutions whose norms, rules, and principles 
may gradually cease to inform state behaviour, treaty-based IGOs can be explicitly terminated through 
legal procedures, making their death relatively easy to ‘diagnose’ (Reus-Smit 2007). Second, theoretical 
predictions regarding institutional robustness are generally stronger for formal, ‘parchment’ institutions 
(Carey 2000) than for their informal counterparts, making deaths among this kind theoretically more 
puzzling. Both rational choice and historical institutional theories hold that formal IGOs make for 
stronger focal points and generate stronger path-dependent and lock-in effects than informal 
institutions.8 Being widely deemed as particularly robust, the death of formal IGOs thus presents a 
                                                     
7 This definition excludes bilateral treaty organizations and IOs formed by non-state parties, as well as IGO “emanations”—
i.e., IGO created by other IGOs. 
8 See Pierson 2004:143. Constructivist theory also suggests that written legal norms have distinctive reinforcing effects 
compared to non-legal norms (Roger and Rowan 2019). 
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promising starting point for expanding our understanding of what causes international institutions to 
collapse. 
Ways to Die 
In legal terms IGO can terminate through five broad processes: their founding treaties can expire; they 
can be explicitly dissolved by their founding members; they can be formally replaced by—or merged 
with—other organizations; or they can simply fall into disuse for a prolonged period (usually stipulated 
as 10 years or longer) after which they are no longer considered to have a binding effect on members.9 
(For a detailed discussion of mechanisms of IGOs termination, see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). 
I. IGO mortality 1815-2016 - Descriptive Statistics  
While we know a lot about the circumstances surrounding IGO creation, we know much less about the 
general conditions under which IGOs die. In this part I therefore present descriptive statistics on IGO 
deaths during the past two centuries. 
Figure 1 depicts rates of IGO creation and termination globally since 1815. It shows that overall 
termination-ratios increase sharply during decades marked by global geopolitical upheaval, with the 
highest death-rates recorded during the 1930s and 1940s (coinciding with the Great Depression and 
World War II), followed by the 1910s (World War I) and 1990s (end of Cold War). Figure 2 shows 
death-rates broken down by geographic region. It shows that whereas organizational terminations peak 
in Europe around the two world wars, and in the Americas between 1910-1930, deaths on the African 
continent climb sharply between 1950-1970, coinciding broadly with decolonization. 
 
                                                     
9 A period of +10 years during which an IO shows no sign of activity is widely considered an expression of tacit agreement 
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Historical and geographic fluctuations in IGO death-ratios provide general clues as to what causes 
organizational deaths to spike, but tells us little about what kinds of organizations die under what specific 
circumstances. To provide a more detailed picture I therefore report the results of a Cox proportional 
hazard analysis which measures mortality according to specific organizational features such as 
membership size, function, and age (Table 1, appendix). Like other historical event analyses, this model 
measures relative mortality by considering the amount of time an IGO has been in existence before death 
strikes.10 
The Cox model shows that the size of an IGO’s membership is a statistically strong predictor of 
death, with an inverse correlation between number of member states and risk of termination. On its own, 
however, this finding must be treated with caution: IGOs that produce significant benefits for members 
may tend to attract more members, implying that size may be confounded with other potentially survival 
enhancing factors, such as ‘effectiveness.’ 
In terms of function, IGOs focused on security and judicial matters display the highest mortality 
rates, followed by IGOs focused on trade and economic and social policy, whereas IGOs that handle 
predominantly technical matters (such as scientific and standard setting bodies) have the lowest 
mortality. Thus, across the two centuries under scrutiny, security organizations are more than twice as 
likely to terminate as IGOs focused on technical matters (Table 1, appendix). 
Turning finally to age, hazard analysis shows that an IGO’s survival chances drop sharply during the 
first three decades of its existence, then decline at a slower rate between 30-50 years, only to stabilize 
at around 50 years (Fig.3). In other words, once an IGO makes it through a perilous youth during which 
it is highly liable to termination, its immediate termination-risk declines.  
To summarize, population-wide statistical analysis reveals that IGO death-rates vary historically 
according to exogenous factors such as geopolitical upheaval, but also according to intrinsic features 
such as membership, function, and age which may serve as either independent or intervening causal 
variables. This raises a number of important questions for further study: How specifically does 
geopolitical turmoil undermine IGOs? How—and to what extent—may endogenous factors such as 
                                                     
10 In a Cox proportional hazard analysis, the hazard-ratio is the ratio of fatality-rates corresponding to different values of an 
explanatory variable. E.g., we may find that IGOs of a particular form die at three times the rate per unit time as the control 
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having a large membership or being long-established reduce the risk of organizational termination? To 
probe deeper into these questions we need an explicit theory of IGO termination to guide our analysis. 
II. A theory of IGO death  
Debates in IR about the creation and endurance of international institutions have traditionally been 
anchored in three main paradigms: power-based accounts, ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘functionalist’ accounts, and 
social constructivism (see Cotrell 2016 for a general overview). These theoretical clusters focus on 
different variables—geopolitical, economic, or social—which generate important institutional 
outcomes. In the past two decades, IR scholars have also increasingly turned to historical institutionalism 
to examine how temporal processes such as ‘critical junctures’ and path-dependent processes shape 
international institutions (Fioretos 2011, 2017; Pierson 2004), and to theories of bureaucracy to examine 
how autonomous organizational agency strengthens IO resilience (Strange 1998; McCalla 1996; Barnett 
and Finnemore 1999, Bernholz 2009; Vaubel 2006, Haftel and Thompson 2006). 
In this part, I concentrate on two broad classes of theoretical arguments: rational-choice and historical 
institutionalist accounts. As discussed, given a predominant focus on theorizing barriers to change, 
neither cluster of theories offers explicit predictions about when IGOs may be forsaken by their creators. 
This does not, however, imply that they cannot potentially explain what ‘kills’ IGOs. By identifying 
sources of institutional endurance, existing theories implicitly provide a starting point for understanding 
the opposite outcome: institutional collapse. From the perspective of extant theory, IGO deaths may be 
simply viewed as theoretically expected events (endurance) that fail to materialize, prompting us to ask 
whether causal factors believed to underpin institutional endurance are absent in these cases (see van 
Evera 1997). Admittedly, this approach has shortcomings. Most obviously, an absence of hypothesized 
‘robustness enhancing’ factors is unlikely to be a direct cause IGO death, but may be merely an 
intervening or contributing factor (in much the same way as immunodeficiency is not the direct cause 
of death in a biological organism but merely a factor increasing vulnerability to disease). Nevertheless, 
by theorizing sources of institutional robustness, existing theories can help to identify candidate factors 
(exogenous and endogenous to institutions) that may disrupt institutional equilibria. At the same time, 
they focus attention on underlying structural factors which may account for systemic variation in 
organizational survivability. 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that I do not intend my formulation of hypotheses to 
usher in a competitive test of rival theoretical paradigms. Rather my aim is to combine insights from 
existing institutionalist theories to build towards an understanding of what causes IGO termination. As 
many scholars have argued (see esp. Pierson 2004; Fioretos 2011, 2017), rather than theoretical 
competitors, rational-choice and historical institutionalist accounts are often complementary, each 
emphasizing different aspects of institutional processes which may explain IGO death. For example, by 
focusing on the utility of institutions to (powerful) states, RC theories draw attention to how factors 
exogenous to institutions—such as war, economic depression or technological developments—alter 
existing balances of power and interests and lead to ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Krasner 1984) characterized 
by rapid institutional change. While having less to say about processes occuring outside institutional 
frameworks, HI scholars draw attention to temporal processes such as positive feedback, sequencing, 
duration, and timing which can enrich ‘thinner’ rationalist understandings of increasing returns from 
institutions, and which explicate both processes of gradual institutional reinforcement and of gradual 
deterioration which may culminate in IGO death (see Pierson 2004; Rixen et al. 2016; Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007:344; Fioretos 2017:15). Combining insights from these perspectives, I thus seek to 
construct an explanation for IGO death which integrates exogenous forces and intrinsic institutional 
features. 
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Exogenous shocks and IGO death  
From the perspective of realist or power-based RC theories, international institutions are created and 
maintained by powerful states to advance national interests. Since they serve the needs of their most 
powerful patrons, institutions are expected to change following major shifts in international power 
balances. Wars and economic depressions feature heavily in such accounts. Thus a large literature 
examines how abrupt shifts in power - like those triggered by the Napoleonic wars or the world wars - 
create opportunities for newly powerful states to remake the international system in accordance with 
their own interests, putting in place institutions which increase the returns to their power and thus ‘lock 
in’ a new status quo (e.g., Gilpin 1981:36; Ikenberry 2001; Mearsheimer 1995:7, 13; Hanrieder 2015; 
Gunitsky 2017).  
Common to both RC and HI theories is that they tend to focus on historical crises or ‘critical 
junctures’ as starting points rather than end-points. Major historical power-shifts are widely depicted as 
great ‘founding moments’ which usher in new institutional orders from which a range of positive 
feedbacks flow. Thus IR scholars have focused significantly greater attention on the new institutional 
bargains that were struck at Versailles (1919) or post-1945 than on pre-existing institutional 
arrangements that were blown apart or left behind. Looking in the other direction, however, a power-
based logic suggests that abrupt power shifts will destroy IGOs that privilege the interests of no-longer 
powerful patrons while leaving intact organizations that serve the interests of currently powerful states. 
This view also offers a two related insights: Since the institutional status quo likely favours traditionally 
powerful states, the push to dismantle existing IGOs can be expected to come from newly powerful 
states that feel disadvantaged by existing arrangements (Jupille et al. 2013:43; Lipscy 2015). Second, 
since they have fewer implications for relative power IGOs with purely technical mandates (e.g., 
metrology or meteorological services) may be expected to be less vulnerable to power shifts than 
‘political’ IGOs (e.g., IGOs focused on trade, finance, political or military cooperation) whose functions 
have direct distributive effects.  
Hypothesis 1. IGO deaths are caused by shifts in international power balances which reduce the 
power of existing institutional patrons vis-à-vis institutional challengers. Hypothesis 1a. ‘Political’ 
IGOs are more vulnerable to changing power distributions than ‘technical’ IGOs. 
Whereas power-based RC theories focus on whether institutions serve the needs of powerful states, 
efficiency-based (or ‘functionalist’11) theories focus greater attention on collective benefits (Hanrieder 
2015). Borrowing from new institutional economics, efficiency-based institutional theories (EFI) hold 
that states create international institutions to reduce transaction costs of cooperation. Institutions fulfil 
this function chiefly by supplying information and by providing focal points that stabilize expectations. 
A core premise of EFI is that designing effective international institutions involves high start-up costs, 
whereas the benefits created by institutions increase with continued use thanks to positive feedback 
processes, including learning- and coordination effects, and economies-of-scale. Thus, “once a given 
institutional equilibrium has been reached, substantial changes in the environment are necessary to alter 
it” (Keohane 1984:101-2. Also Hanrieder 2015:17; Jupille et al. 2013).  
This does not imply that institutions are ever-lasting. Rather, EFI scholars conceive of institutions as 
equilibria which track efficiency (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Jupille et al. 2013). Institutions are 
expected to endure as long as they solve (or are perceived to solve) cooperation problems more 
efficiently than alternative institutions - or no institution (Stein 1990:50-1). To the extent exogenous 
events such as wars, economic change or shifts in technology reduce the expected utility to actors of 
adhering to existing institutional equilibria, institutional change is likely to follow. This logic may seem 
difficult to distinguish from a realist reasoning that also stresses exogenous shocks to state interests. By 
                                                     
11 As Pierson (2004:106) notes, power-based RC theories are also ‘functionalist’ in their presumption that institutions exist 
because they serve the needs of currently powerful actors. I thus prefer to distinguish between efficiency-based v. power-
based theories. 
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conceiving of institutional efficiency in terms of collective benefits rather than narrow benefits to 
powerful states, however, EFI theories highlight that IGO terminations may be driven by exogenous 
changes (including technological changes) which alter state interests independently of shifts in material 
power.  
Hypothesis 2: IGO deaths are caused by political, economic and technological changes which reduce 
expected collective utility of existing institutions.  
Endogenous Factors: Adaptability as a function of scope, structure and size 
Whether one adopts a power-based or efficiency-based rationale for the creation and maintenance of 
international institutions, a cursory historical survey of IGO deaths (Part 1) suggests that exogenous 
shocks alone are insufficient to explain variation in IGO terminations. Wars, economic depression, and 
technological change may kill many IGOs, but many more survive. To explain IGO death we thus need 
a systemic theory that explains why some IGOs cope better with exogenous shocks than others. 
A starting point is to consider variation in IGOs’ capacity for adaptation. Faced with exogenous 
shock an IGO’s continued utility—to powerful states or wider groups—may depend on how easily it 
can be adapted to changing circumstances. IR scholars have suggested different ways of conceptualizing 
institutional adaptability. According to Wallander (2000:706) an institution’s adaptability to change 
depends mainly on whether its assets—its principles, rules and procedures—are specific or general. 
Specific assets facilitate particular transactions for a specific purpose, and confer efficiency gains for 
those particular transactions, whereas general assets confer efficiency gains on a variety of different 
transactions in different contexts (ibid.; also Keohane 1984:90). Although asset-specificity may be a 
function of multiple factors, this logic suggests that ‘General-purpose’ IGOs (i.e., IGOs whose mandates 
cover a number of different policy-areas) are easier to adapt to new problems than ‘task-specific’ IGOs 
(Lenz et al. 2014) that serve narrowly-defined purposes for which they have developed highly 
specialized routines and expertise. 
A second aspect of adaptability is organizational apparatus. As Wallander explains, ‘general assets’ 
can be conceived as institutional assets that enable states to cooperate more efficiently by providing 
information, and by establishing clear rules for negotiation, decision-making, monitoring and dispute 
resolution which reduce transaction costs and increase transparency (2000:707). IGOs offering 
centralized information-provision, decision-making and implementation thus provide general assets 
which increase the efficiency of transactions in a variety of cooperative contexts. A large literature also 
finds that centralization enhances IGOs’ capacity for autonomous action which in turn increases 
organizational capacity to make timely strategic decisions to accommodate environmental change 
(Haftel and Thompson 2006:260; Bernholz 2009; Lall 2017; Abbott et al. 2016).  
A final factor of adaptability is organizational size. Population-wide hazard analysis (part 1) showed 
an inverse relationship between the size of an IGO’s membership and mortality. As discussed, this 
correlation may be spurious. There are, however, several theoretic reasons to expect size to affect 
mortality. The more members an IGO has, the larger the number of patrons to whom its functions are of 
potential future value, and who have expended resources to create dedicated mechanisms to support its 
functions. For example, most countries have established permanent diplomatic missions to the UN and 
created national bodies to implement diverse UN conventions. In addition to the specific purposes for 
which they were created, these structures also serve a wider range of diplomatic functions and domestic 
political purposes, thus creating additional stakeholders with an interest in their perpetuation. Much like 
banks, some IGOs may thus be ‘too big to fail’. Size may also affect organizational adaptability in a 
second way. Whereas IGOs with narrow membership may be vulnerable to changes in the political 
situation of a single member-state, IGOs whose membership span many countries may be able to 
‘average outcomes’ across member states, thus reducing vulnerability to country- or region-specific 
shocks (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). To illustrate, a global trade organization with 150 members may 
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not be fatally undermined if a handful of members leave, whereas an IGO with just three members would 
cease to exist should one party withdraw.  
It is important to acknowledge that size could be hypothesized to have the opposite effect. More 
member states may imply greater preference heterogeneity which in turn reduces strategic flexibility by 
multiplying veto-points.12 But whereas large size may reduce IGOs’ capacity to respond swiftly and 
flexibly to environmental challenges, it may nonetheless increase adaptability understood as resilience. 
Specifically, adaptability does not necessarily require agent-driven strategic flexibility, but may simply 
entail that an IGO holds continued value for a sufficient subset of stakeholders despite changed 
circumstances. Thus, while size may reduce one aspect of resilience - strategic flexibility - it broadly 
underpins IGO’s ability to adapt to exogenous change. 
From this analysis I identify three factors—narrow scope, low centralization, and small size—that 
contribute to IGO mortality by reducing adaptability to change. Death becomes more likely if any of the 
three causes are present, but especially so when they exist in combination.13 These factors are likely to 
be particularly consequential in conjunction with exogenous shocks. Specific assets or small size may 
not greatly penalize an IGO during periods of relative stability. However, these factors are likely to grow 
more decisive in rapidly changing environments when institutions come under pressure to adapt. 
Hypothesis 3: IGOs are more likely to terminate if they have i) small membership, ii) narrow scope, iii) 
low centralization. Mortality among IGOs with these features will increase in rapidly changing 
environments. 
Reconciling Exogenous and Endogenous Factors: Time and Sequencing 
I have hypothesized that IGO deaths are caused by a combination of exogenous shocks and intrinsic 
institutional features such as narrow size and scope, and low centralization. An additional aspect 
(bridging exogenous and endogenous domains) is temporality. Unlike rational-choice theories which 
conceive of actors as free to abandon institutions when they no longer maximize utility (Rixen and Viola 
2014), a core insight of historical institutionalism is that institutions are subject to strong ‘lock-in’ 
effects, arising from various positive feedback processes and complementarities existing within a given 
institutional system. These processes imply that, once a particular institutional path gets established, the 
cost of reversals increase drastically (North 1990:89; Pierson 2004:10). From this perspective, 
institutions may endure not because they present efficient solutions to collective action problems, “but 
simply because barriers to change grow over time” (Fioretos 2017:9, 13).  
By emphasizing path-dependence and positive feedback, HI theories suggest that time has certain 
properties insofar as it matters when institutions are introduced, in what order, and how long they have 
been around—individually or jointly (Pierson 2004:1; Fioretos 2017). HI scholars point to three kinds 
of positive feedback which may strengthen institutional lock-in over time. The first is adaptive 
behaviour. Institutions in place for extended periods lead to shifts in the expectations of social actors, 
causing them to adjust their policy preferences and routines in ways that reinforce initial institutional 
choices (Pierson 2004:85, Levi 2000:94). Second, institutions in place for extended periods accumulate 
knowledge and expertise which leads to higher returns from continuing use (‘learning effects’) (Pierson 
2000:253; North 1990:95). Third, over time, institutions may develop exchange relationships with other 
actors which lead to the adoption of complementary institutions and practices, increasing overall 
                                                     
12 A large literature holds that large group size reduces capacity for collective action. See, e.g., Oye 1986; Kahler 1992; Downs, 
Rocke and Barsoom 1996; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009. 
13 Individually, these causes may be neither necessary nor sufficient, but work in combination to produce organizational 
failure. In short, they are ‘probability raisers’ (Mahoney 2008:7, 13).  
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benefits within an institutional matrix (‘coordination effects’).14 The longer an IGO is in place the greater 
adaptation, learning and coordination effects it is likely subject to. By contrast, newly created IGOs are 
less likely to benefit from learning or adaptation effects, or to have developed strong exchange 
relationships with governments or other stakeholders which embed them securely in wider institutional 
matrixes.15 
Hypothesis 4: Young IGOs have higher mortality rates due to limited learning effects, and low 
environmental embeddedness. 
Not only the passage of time, but also the timing and sequencing of events may affect IGO mortality. 
As Pierson (2004) notes, a focus on path-dependence and self-reinforcement raises a conundrum: How 
can we think systematically about causal processes involving the interaction of large systemic shocks—
such as the onset of global war or economic depression—and ongoing processes of institutional 
cooperation which are quite separate from these shocks, but which embed IGOs more deeply in their 
environments over time? One answer is timing. It is plausible that young age occurs low penalties in a 
stable environment but results in elevated termination risk during times of rapid change.16 Thus, IGOs 
hit by exogenous shock early in their life-span are likely to succumb, whereas newly founded IGOs not 
subjected to shock may continue. 
Hypothesis 4a: Young IGOs have higher overall mortality rates, but ‘liability of youth’ increases in 
rapidly changing environments. 
A second answer is sequencing. Both HI and RC theories of ‘first-mover advantages’ suggest that when 
a particular process occurs in a sequence matters insofar as “early developments become deeply 
embedded in a particular environment, altering the resources and incentive structures…of social actors, 
and thus changing subsequent events” (Pierson 2004:64). Much like early entry into a market can confer 
a leading market position on firms (Baum and Shipilov 2006), being first to facilitate cooperation on a 
given international problem may be advantageous for IGOs, since once a specific rule-set is chosen it is 
subject to strong positive feedback (Jupille et al. 2013:211). All else equal, relatively older IGOs are 
more likely to have enjoyed opportunities to shape their environments in ways that lay the foundations 
for their own perpetuation. While absolute age offers a proxy for learning effects and secure exchange 
relationships, relative age is thus a proxy for institutional first-comer advantages. 
Hypothesis 5: IGOs that are young relative to peers with similar mandates or functions are of higher 
risk of termination. 
As with size, the notion that growing age reduces mortality is far from obvious. Older IGOs tend to have 
more formalized structures, more standardized routines, and greater accumulation of sunk costs which 
may discourage organizational change (Levitt and March 1988). Hence one might expect adaptability to 
decline with age (Hannan & Freeman 1984, 1989; Ranger-Moore 1997:904). Furthermore, since 
organizations tend to reflect their founding environment, recently created IGOs are more likely to reflect 
the current preferences of stakeholders, whereas older IGOs may be at greater risk of being obsolete. 
However, given some minimal element of institutional updating over time, I expect that ‘liabilities of 
age’ are outweighed by the positive feedback processes which anchor IGOs more firmly in their 
environments over time. This means that the older an IGO is, the older it is likely to grow. Far from 
tautological, this is precisely what institutional path-dependence entails. 
                                                     
14 Coordination effects obtain when the value of an activity increases with more actors adopting the same option. Pierson 
2004:24. See also North 1990:95; Fioretos 2011:377. 
15 Environmental embeddedness is not a direct causal effect of age. Rather age serves as a proxy for the path-dependent 
processes which embed IGOs more deeply in their environments over time. 
16 On variation in organizational age-dependence according to exogenous change, see Ranger-More 1997. 
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III. Empirics: IGO deaths, 1939-1949 and 1979-1989 
From previous analysis we know that periods of geopolitical and economic instability are associated 
with elevated IGO death-rates. We also know that many IGOs survive wars and economic crises. In the 
previous section, I identified intrinsic factors which I posit contribute to IGO termination. These causal 
factors are separate from, but complementary to, exogenous shocks. Thus while IGOs with small size 
or narrow scope may incur only slight penalties in stable environments, such features are likely to make 
IGOs particularly vulnerable to termination during periods of rapid environmental change. 
Given the hypothesized interaction of exogenous and intrinsic causes of IGO death, a good starting 
point for testing my hypotheses is to examine changes in the IGO population during a period of high 
environmental stress which affects a large segment of the population. Focusing on a period during which 
large numbers of IGOs are subject to a similar systemic shock allows me to check for the 
presence/absence of intrinsic features assumed to help some organizations cope with stress while others 
succumb. Results can later be refined by examining the incidence and profile of IGO terminations during 
a period of relative environmental stability (on my theory, IGOs that terminate during periods of low 
environmental stress should have similar profiles, but instances of termination should be rarer). This 
medium-n, cross-section analysis will in turn allow me to identify promising candidates for further in-
depth case study. 
Identifying ‘systemic shocks’ 
I have proposed that IGO deaths are caused by exogenous shocks which alter state preferences and 
reduce the utility of existing institutions to powerful states or wider stakeholder groups. Exogenous 
shocks may take different forms (a point to which I return later). However, the most commonly cited 
cause of changing state preferences over international cooperation are sudden shifts in relative power. 
To observe the impact of power-shifts on IGO terminations, I borrow from Gunitsky’s (2011) measure 
of ‘power volatility’ which considers annual changes in relative power among major state powers based 
on Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores (Singer 1963). Gunitsky identifies two 
periods of extreme volatility, 1917-1922 and 1940-1947, and a lesser spike, 1989-1995. Other scholars 
(e.g., Gates et al., 2007:19) have defined global ‘shock years’ as lasting from 1914–23, 1939–49, and 
1989–96. Given that Gunitsky’s measure also shows volatility climbing sharply from 1914 and staying 
elevated until 1923, I thus identify three periods of rapid change in global power distributions: 1914-
1923, 1939-1949 and 1989-1996. To capture other aspects of geopolitical change (in addition to shifts 
in demographic, military and industrial strength which are the main components of CINC scores), I also 
include the Great Depression (1929-39), a period of rapid economic change, and 1956-68 as a period of 
rapid decolonization across Africa marked by large shifts in political power.  
This list is not exhaustive. It omits many shocks at regional or sub-regional level, and sector-specific 
shocks like the international oil crises. However, by identifying systemic shocks which affect large 
segments of the IGO population, it provides a starting point for observing variation in the impact of 
exogenous shocks on IGO mortality in a systematic manner. 
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Table 2 
Periods of high volatility in power Rising / declining powers 
1914-1924 (WWI)  
1929-1939 (Great Depression) 
1939-1949 (WWII)  
1956-1968 (Decolonization, Africa)  









Former colonial powers 
USSR 
As illustrated in Table 3, the periods of high power volatility identified above all display elevated IGO 
termination-ratios (18%-35% of the incumbent population per decade), whereas global ‘low stress’ 
periods have lower termination-ratios (3%-12%/decade). To examine the possibility that technical IGOs 
may be less vulnerable to power shifts than other organizations (hypothesis 1a), I also compare the 
distribution of deaths for technical v. ‘political’ IGOs. I find termination-rates among ‘political’ IGOs 
soaring as high as 46% during the world wars, whereas death-ratios for technical IGOs remain low (11-
15%). By contrast, the highest death-ratios among technical IGOs occur during the Great Depression 
and from 1956-1968. This divergence leads me to treat these groups as separate sub-populations for the 
purpose of further analysis. 
















1900-1913 Low 13 1  (24) 3% 6% 0% 3 / 22 
1914-1924 High 10 16  (46) 35% 46% 11% 21.8 / 22.5 
1924-1929 Low 5 0  (53) 0% 0% 0% -  / 20.9 
1929-1939 Medium 10 15  (70) 21% 24% 29% 14.7 / 21.4 
1939-1949 High 10 19 (64) 30% 36% 15% 22 / 29 
1949-1956  Medium 7 12  (84) 20% 27% 5% 14.9 / 26.4 
 1956-1968  High 12 28  (118)       23%** 21% 16% 13.3 / 21.3  
1968-1979 Low 11 21  (179) 11% 11% 11% 10.4 / 23 
1979-1989 Low 10 17  (260) 7% 7% 4% 16.2 / 22.6 
1989-1997 High 8 42* (300) 18% 20% 6% 20.0 / 29.1 
1997-2015 Low 17 44  (348) 7% 9% 3% 23.0 / 32.5 
*  this measure captures the age of IGOs at the start of each period. 
** terminations during this period are predominantly in Africa and Asia. 
My detailed analysis of the timing of IGO deaths provides general support for hypotheses 1 and 2 which 
stress power shifts or rapid economic change as causes of IGO death, and for hypothesis 1a which posits 
lower vulnerability to power-shifts among technical IGOs. But without closer scrutiny we cannot tell 
how such shocks impact different IGOs. In the remainder of the paper I undertake a detailed analysis of 
the periods 1939-1949 and 1969-1979. These periods provide a good basis for structured comparison 
given that they feature both a period of rapidly shifting power among great powers, and one of relative 
stability at the global level. 
In the previous section, I pointed to intrinsic factors such as small size, narrow scope, low 
centralization and young age as potential causes of IGO collapse. Some of these factors may be 
correlated. For example, younger IGOs may on average have smaller membership and less centralized 
structures. Yet hazard analysis reveals a statistically significant effect for each factor separately, 
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suggesting the merit of exploring their impact through further medium-n and case-based analysis to 
tease out their individual effects. I begin with a broad cross-sectional analysis, before proceeding to 
more detailed case-studies. Relevant institutional features are operationalized as follows: 
‘centralization’ is measured on a scale from 0-3 according to whether an IGO provides centralized 
dispute resolution, monitoring or enforcement. To determine the scope of an IGO’s policy portfolio I 
borrow and adapt a list of 26 policy-areas set out by Hooghe and co-authors (2017) (see codebook). 
IGOs whose mandate span more than three policy-areas are considered ‘general purpose’.17 IGO 
membership size and age are both recorded at the beginning of each period examined. 
IGO Deaths 1939-1949 
Given high termination-rates during the 1930s, 62 IGOs were in existence worldwide in 1939 (down 
from 70 a decade earlier). Of these, 17 died between 1939-49. Another two were founded and terminated 
during this period, bringing total deaths to 19 (see table 4, appendix, for an itemized list).  
When considering what (if anything) distinguished fatalities from survivors, the most conspicuous 
factors are geography and function. The majority of IGOs that collapsed had either exclusively European 
membership or a preponderance of European members. By contrast, regional and inter-regional IGOs 
in other parts of the world (e.g., the Americas, Africa, and the Commonwealth) were less likely to 
succumb.18 Technical IGOs had lower death-rates (15%) than non-technical IGOs (36%) (table 3). These 
findings provide direct support for hypotheses 1 and 1a regarding the adverse effect of abrupt power 
shifts for political IGOs. A second factor is length of prior lifespan. The average age (as of 1939) of 
IGOs that terminated between 1939-49 was 23 years v. 29 years for survivors, meaning that IGOs that 
were slightly younger when war broke out were less likely to survive (hypothesis 4). IGOs that 
terminated had an average of 20 members v. 23 for survivors. When separating the population into 
‘technical’ v. ‘political’ organizations, size grows somewhat more significant with terminated technical 
IGOs having on average 23 members v. 27 for survivors. Scope is not significant as surviving and 
terminated IGOs address roughly the same number of policy issues, and centralization scores are higher 
for terminated IGOs (0.6 v. 0.4) (table 4). Findings from this period thus provide mixed support for 
hypothesis 3 which stresses the positive benefits of size, scope and centralization for survivability. 
In addition to confirming hypotheses regarding the effects of power shifts, analysis of the WWII 
period draws attention to a small group of long-lived IGOs which should be of particular interest to IO 
scholars. 19 of 45 IGOs that persisted through the period 1939-49 were founded prior to 1914. Not only 
did these organizations survive two world wars, but fourteen of these ‘double-veterans’ are still 
operative today. When considering what may account for their durability despite profound changes in 
the conditions that gave rise to them – including major shifts in economic and military power - three 
factors stand out. First, most focus on narrowly technical issues related to research, standards and 
measures, or postal services. None focus on security or trade. Second, with an average age of 52 years 
by 1939 (or 27 years by 1914) these organizations were already firmly established when global conflict 
broke out (hypothesis 4). Third, their advanced age—in absolute and relative terms—means that these 
IGOs likely benefitted from ‘first-comer’ status (hypothesis 5). Organizations such as the International 
Telecommunication Union (1865-), the Universal Postal Union (1874-), or the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures (1875-) to list a few examples, were all ‘pioneers’ in their fields in that they were 
first to facilitate broad international cooperation on specific problems. Being first out of the gate allowed 
these organizations to shape the core norms and practices of cooperation in their respective fields, and 
led to early adaptation by other actors which further reinforced these norms, protecting them against 
                                                     
17 Whereas the population-wide hazard analysis reported in table 1 (appendix) distinguishes only between general-purpose v. 
task-specific IGOs, this section provides a detailed measure by counting the number of specific policy-issues addressed by 
an IGO. 
18 IGO deaths in other regions also track power volatility. E.g. African regional IGOs were five times as likely to terminate 
as European IGOs during 1960s.  
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challenges from competing rule-sets or administrative practice. To illustrate, the ITU has been in 
continuous operation since 1865 whereas later IGOs focused on telecommunication (e.g., the Radio-
Telegraph Union, 1906-32, the International Telegraph Committee, 1925-56, the International Long-
distance Telephone Council, 1925-56, and the inter-American Radio Office, 1937-63) have all had 
shorter life-spans, eventually ceding their functions to the ITU. 
IGO Deaths, 1969-1979 
Before turning to case studies, I briefly compare findings from 1939-49 to the period 1969-1979 which 
featured relatively low volatility in global power distributions (table 2; Gunitsky 2011). The global IGO 
population in 1969 was 179. Of these, 21 died by 1979 (11%/decade). Death-rates among technical and 
non-technical IGOs did not differ during this period. However, both age and membership emerge as 
strong predictors of death. Thus surviving IGOs had been in place for an average of 23 years by 1969, 
while IGOs that terminated had lived for just 10 years (table 5, appendix). Surviving IGOs had on 
average 29 members v. just 10 for IGOs that died. As expected (hypothesis 3) centralization scores are 
higher for surviving IGOs (0.8 v. 0.5) during this period while, contrary to expectations scope is lower 
for survivors. 
It is important to note that although 1969-79 was a period of low power volatility at the global level, 
several IGO terminations can be linked to local power shifts caused by changing political conditions or 
inter-state conflict. For example, the International Red Locust Control Service was dissolved in 1970 
due to growing tension between the South African and Portugese governments and a group of newly 
independent African states that withdrew their membership to form an independent organization 
(Byaruhanga 1999). Similarly, the Asian & Pacific Council (founded in 1966 to contain the spread of 
Communism in Asia) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (a US-led collective defence treaty 
formed to ‘counter Communist aggression’) dissolved in the mid-1970s after Sino-American 
rapprochement robbed these organizations of their purpose (Reinalda 2009:372). Thus, while low power 
volatility at global level may account for overall low death-rates during this period, many individual 
deaths can be linked to local shifts in power. 
Comparison of the two periods provides two important insights. First, whereas high geopolitical 
volatility during 1939-49 increased death-rates for all IGOs it did so more dramatically for ‘political’ 
than for technical IGOs (36% v.15%). By contrast technical and political IGOs suffered similar, and 
lower, death-rates during the geopolitically more stable period 1969-79 (11%) (consistent with 
hypothesis 1a). Second, whereas small size and young age were associated with higher death-rates 
during both periods (confirming hypothesis 3), these factors were of greater significance during 1969-
79. Centralization also asserted a protective effect only during 1969-79.19 Thus, contrary to my 
expectation that intrinsic features will have greater impact on mortality during geo-politically volatile 
periods, the opposite appears to be true: intrinsic institutional factors appear more decisive during stable 
periods when state interests shift less abruptly. Conversely, the ‘protective’ effects of a large 
membership, centralized organizational apparatus or mature age appear to be partly cancelled out by 
dramatic shifts in power distributions, such as that following WWII.  
                                                     
19 Contrary to my prediction, broad scope did not shield IGOs from termination during either period. However, 
my general hazard analysis finds that broad scope has a positive effect for the population as a whole. An 
explanation may be that most General-Purpose IGOs are often political in nature, committing their members 
to shared goals such as ‘political and economic integration’ (EU) or ‘national liberty and international justice’ 
(League of Nations) (Lenz et al. 2014:147). For this reason many broad scope IGOs may be particular vulnerable 
to the kind of geopolitical change characterizing, e.g., the WWII period.  
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IV. Case Studies 
Population-wide analysis of the IGO population during specific historical periods confirms that geo-
political change kills many IGOs. It also confirms that IGOs that terminate are on average younger and 
smaller than enduring organizations, and more likely to focus on security or trade than on purely 
technical matters. Yet, how this contributes to their undoing remains uncertain. Statistical analysis seeks 
to identify typical causal effects across the general population as opposed to individual cases. It relies 
on a probability-based definition of causality where a ‘cause’ is a value on a variable that makes certain 
outcomes more likely (Mahoney 2008:2-4). To gain a better understanding of how specific causal factors 
contribute to IGO death this section therefore supplements statistical analysis with historical case-
studies that allow me to trace the processes through which specific factors—jointly or singly—cause 
IGOs to terminate. 
My case-selection abides by two criteria. First, by comparing cases of both terminated and enduring 
IGOs I provide stronger tests of individual hypotheses. Second, by focusing on cases of ‘unlikely 
survival’ (i.e., IGOs that persist despite major changes in the conditions which gave rise to them) as well 
as ‘unexpected death’ I seek to discover potential variables omitted from the large-n study which may 
be influencing results and thus generate new hypotheses for future research (on use of ‘least likely’ cases 
to generate new research questions, see Levy 2007:202). These criteria lead me to select four cases for 
closer study. 
The International Bureau of Education, 1929-1969 
My first case, the International Bureau of Education (IBE), fits the profile of a ‘typical survivor’. 
Founded in 1925 as a private organization by the Institute Rosseau, IBE was constituted as an IGO in 
1929, becoming the first intergovernmental organization to facilitate exchange of information and 
research on education. During the ten years prior to WWII, IBE was highly active despite a limited 
budget and staff (Rosselló). In 1934, the Bureau founded the International Conference on Public 
Education (ICPE)–an annual governmental forum focused on educational development. Thanks to 
the success of the ICPE, IBE’s membership—which spanned Europe and Latin America—grew 
rapidly from twelve in 1929 to fifteen by 1939, and twenty by the end of the war, providing a broad 
base of support. 
During the war years, as it became impossible to convene the ICPE, IBE created the Service of 
Intellectual Assistance to Prisoners of War (SIAP) providing books and intellectual services to prisoners 
of war in collaboration with the International Red Cross. SIAP was initially funded by the Swiss Federal 
Council but given high demand funding soon fell short. In 1940, IBE began to issue postal stamps to 
fund the project, and by the end of the war had distributed more than 600,000 books and organized 
“Internment Universities’ in many prisoner camps. Rather than falling dormant during the war, as 
happened to many technical IGOs, IBE thus successfully refocused its activities and adapted its 
funding model to meet war needs.  
Besides operational flexibility, an important factor in IBE’s survival was its apolitical, technical 
nature which insulated it from geopolitical strife and other forms of distributive conflict. Created to 
provide a forum “neutral from national, political, philosophical and religious point of view in a strictly 
scientific and objective state of mind” (IBE Statutes 1929) and focused strictly on exchange of 
information and data IBE’s activities were politically unobtrusive. This apolitical stance grew 
increasingly important as IBE’s membership expanded. To tackle the challenges of a diverse 
membership, IBE “ceaselessly stayed clear of interfering with the educational freedom of partners.” 
Rather than pushing for standardization of global educational development the Bureau sought “to take 
into account the specific needs of each region so as to highlight the main trends in order to shape the 
worldwide educational movement” thus seeking to promote universal education without interfering with 
local priorities (Hofstetter and Schneuwly 2013:217; ICPE II, M. 1934:158). Internationally, IBE 
likewise remained politically neutral. In 1963 a group of newly independent African nations sought to 
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use the worldwide platform of ICPE to protest colonial policies by demanding that Portugal be excluded 
from the conference for “offending the sacred principles of education.” IBE’s directorship emphatically 
argued that banning a convened member of political grounds would contradict IBE’s “technical, 
scientific and universal features” and insisted that “other organizations could take on that responsibility” 
(Hofstetter and Schneuwly 2013:228). 
A third basis of IBE’s ability to weather geopolitical change lay in its high informational value and 
technical expertise. By 1929, with only four full-time employees, IBE had already organized ten 
international congresses, working with the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization 
and several international research and professional associations (Rosselló). Its ‘pedagogical tour of the 
world’ which collected data on national educational reforms and issued recommendations had reached 
more than 70 countries,20 and provided a crucial resource for national reformers. Thus when UNESCO 
was created in 1945, IBE helped develop its education programs, building on its significant experience. 
By 1952, a permanent joint commission was established to facilitate cooperation between IBE and 
UNESCO which henceforth jointly organized the IPCE, and in 1969, IBE formally joined UNESCO, 
making it the first of UNESCO's category 1 institutes. However, IBE maintained both intellectual and 
functional autonomy. Thus consistent with my theoretical expectations, IBE’s technical mandate and 
organizational autonomy (which enabled it to fund its own activities) were key to IBE’s survival. This 
combined with the fact that the Bureau had achieved a relatively settled status by the time war broke out 
and benefitted from a large, diverse membership (as well as ties to other institutions), to whom its 
services remained relevant despite geopolitical conflict.  
The European Commission for the Danube, 1856-1939 
In contrast to the IBE which not only persisted but expanded its membership during WWII, an early 
casualty of the global conflict was the European Commission for the Danube (CED). Created to keep 
important waterways open to traffic and commerce, the European river commissions were economically 
and militarily vitally important. The International Conventions governing navigation on the Rhine, Elbe 
and Danube formed integral parts of earlier geopolitical settlements, starting with the Vienna Peace 
Treaty of 1815 which guaranteed freedom of navigation, and extended by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 
which ended the Crimean War (Act of Navigation-Art.15-19). During WWI, the Danube was controlled 
by Germany and Austria-Hungary that used the river as base for warships. At the Versailles Peace 
conference of 1919, “in an effort to block the resurgence of German or Russian power”, the Allies’ 
Supreme Council decided that membership of the Commission should henceforth include the riparian 
states plus Britain, France and Italy, while former CED members Russia and Turkey were expelled, thus 
tilting the organizational balance of power towards the Allies (Popper 1943).  
During the 1920s and early 1930s the CED undertook important works to deepen and widen passages 
of the river (Popper 1943), but as WWII loomed, the Commission’s fate once again grew uncertain. 
From 1936, German parts of Danube were controlled by Nazi Germany, and on 14 November 1936 
Germany announced it would cease all cooperation with the river commissions established by the 
Versailles Treaty.21 According to British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, “Germany justifies this step 
on the ground that the Articles in question were dictated to Germany and not freely negotiated…and 
clarifies that for the future national treatment will be accorded on a basis of reciprocity on German 
waterways to the vessels of all States living at peace with Germany”.22 Not content to have renounced 
cooperation, in August 1940 the Reich unilaterally declared the dissolution of the CED noting that “this 
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ends the existence of a valuable source of information for the Allies on the economic situation in 
Danubian territory" (New York Times 30-aug-1940). 
Once the war ended in Allied victory, the future of the European river commissions was once again 
on the international agenda. In 1948 negotiations began in Belgrade about re-establishing free navigation 
on the Danube. However, new geo-political realities, in particular the beginnings of Cold War conflict, 
made agreement impossible. The USSR, which now controlled the votes of all but one riparian state, 
categorically rejected proposals by France, Britain and the U.S. to restore freedom of navigation, thereby 
ending eight decades of cooperation within the framework of the CED (Reinalda 2009:107-9). A new 
Danube Convention was agreed under Soviet leadership without participation of the Western powers 
and the commitment to free navigation soon withered. 
The dissolution of the CED fits the narrative of a rising power—Germany before the war; the USSR 
in its aftermath—seeking to overturn an established international regime to replace it with a new scheme 
that better suits its interests. The CED’s demise stands in contrast to the Central Commission for 
Navigation of the Rhine (1815-present) which, due to its different geography, remained dominated by 
the western Allies and thus continued to ensure freedom of navigation after the war. This case thus 
underscores that it is often the interests of powerful states that determine which institutions are adapted 
and which disappear. Yet the Danube Commission’s long history also illustrates other aspects of IGO 
survivability/mortality. The CED was unique among 20th century IGOs in having far-ranging 
autonomous powers which included the authority to collect tolls and dues from ships, to borrow money 
on private markets, and to issue regulations with binding effect without approval by member states 
(Krehbiel 1918). Though it did not avert the death of the CED in a geopolitically divided Europe, this 
autonomy helped it weather earlier crises, as when, in 1866, the Commission found itself close to 
bankruptcy due to the Austro-Prussian war and raised money by issuing bonds, offering the river tolls 
as security (ibid.). The ability to contract private loans also allowed the Commission to stay solvent 
during the 1930s when the Great Depression led to a dramatic reduction in trade-related river transport 
(Potter 1943). 
The Bank for International Settlements, 1930-present 
At first sight, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) appears a somewhat ‘unlikely survivor’ of 
the period 1939-49. Founded in 1930 by Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, Japan and 
Switzerland to oversee the payment of war reparations imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty 
(Art.3-BIS Statute), the BIS also had a second purpose; to promote cooperation among central banks 
and to facilitate international financial operations (Art.4-BIS Statute). Created during a period of global 
financial turmoil, dealing with a highly politicized issue (war reparations), and having a small 
membership of mainly European states most of whom would fight on opposite sides as war broke out 
within a decade of BIS’ founding, the Bank would seem highly vulnerable to termination. Its survival 
is the more surprising since BIS came under direct attack by the most world’s powerful country, the US, 
which demanded its dissolution (Bernholz 2009). Despite these unpromising beginnings, the BIS 
survived multiple crises and remains operational to this day. What explains its persistence? 
The first challenge to BIS’ existence resulted from the breakdown of the Gold Standard, and the 
termination of German reparation payments (Lausanne Agreement, July 1932)—both consequences of 
the Great Depression. These events made BIS’ main task of facilitating WWI reparation payments 
obsolete and caused a 50% reduction in net profits between 1932-1939 (Bernholz 2009). Robbed of its 
chief purpose, the BIS instead focused on its second statutory task; fostering cooperation between central 
banks. For this purpose it increased its emphasis on information and research activities (Fabianni and 
Pattison 2001). As political tensions deepened in Europe, the BIS was instrumental in helping 
continental European central banks transfer part of their monetary reserves overseas—to London and 
New York. Its early survival was thus ensured by the range of its tasks (Bernholz 2009). Indeed, “had it 
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not been for Article 3…BIS would have disintegrated in 1932 when the Lausanne Agreement brought 
war reparations to an end.” (Fratianni and Pattison 2001:199).  
A second challenge arose in September 1939 as war broke out between the UK, France and Germany, 
all three BIS members. BIS’ Board of Directors decided to suspend meetings for the duration of the war 
but resolved that the Bank would stay open, conducting its operations in a neutral manner that 
“advantages neither side” (BIS.Org 2019). As the war went on, however, evidence mounted that BIS 
were conducting operations that benefitted Germany. During the war BIS’ business declined sharply, 
and in July 1944 the UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods which established the 
IMF and World Bank adopted ‘Resolution V’ calling for the liquidation of the BIS at “the earliest 
possible moment” (opcit). The chief architects of Bretton Woods–Harry Dexter White of the US 
Treasury and John Maynard Keynes–strongly opposed the BIS due to its wartime assistance to the Axis 
Powers, and because they saw it as a direct obstacle to a new international monetary order with the IMF 
at its centre (Frantianni and Pattison 2001:201). Nevertheless, in 1946, the BIS Board of Directors held 
their first post-war meeting to decide how to defend the Bank. Maurice Frere, Governor of the National 
Bank of Belgium travelled to Washington to lobby American policymakers (Lebor 2014), and in May 
1948 the Washington Agreement was signed whereby the BIS consented to reimburse looted gold from 
the German Reich to the Allied Tripartite Commission.23 Soon thereafter Resolution V was set aside. 
“Quietly, carefully, barely noticed by the outside world, the BIS returned to business as usual.” (Lebor 
2014). 
Having narrowly survived the war, the key to BIS’ long-term survival was its significant expertise 
on European monetary and financial issues. During the 1930s and 1940s, the BIS had established itself 
as an essentially European institution whereas the IMF and World Bank had worldwide focus (Bernholz 
2009). The BIS thus enjoyed strong support among European central bankers who found that, rather 
than duplicate the functions of the IMF, the BIS was useful in making the Bretton Woods system 
function in a European context, and in serving specific European priorities and needs (Auboin 1955:17). 
When the Benelux, France and Italy struck an Agreement on Multilateral Monetary Compensation in 
1947 they invited BIS to act as the technical agent. In 1950, when the European Payments Union was 
established within the framework of the Marshall Plan to restore European currency convertibility, BIS 
was again appointed managing agent—a role it repeated as manager of the EMU, 1979-1994. 
Looking across BIS’ history, three factors appear crucial to its ability to weather environmental 
change. First, its immediate survivability was enhanced by the range of its tasks and, in particular, by 
the value of its services to several stakeholder groups. Beyond contracting governments, the governors 
of European central banks were keenly interested in having an institution where they could meet and 
cooperate free of political influences (Bernholz 2009). A second factor was a high degree of 
organizational autonomy which allowed the Board of Directors to formulate independent business goals. 
Over time, the BIS has assumed a role as fund manager for other international financial institutions and 
during the 1980s and 1990s the Bank began to act as ‘emergency funder’ for nations in trouble, coming 
to the aid of Mexico and Brazil during their debt crises in 1982 and 1998, thereby widening the group 
of stakeholders to whom its services are of value. 
A third factor underpinning BIS’ survival has been its ability to finance activities independently of 
government funding—a fact which saved it from bankruptcy during WWII (Bernholz 2009)—and which 
has been an important basis of organizational autonomy since. This aspects mirrors the fate of the IBE 
and provides a contrast to many IGOs whose work became practically impossible during the Great 
Depression and WWII due to lacking funds and a resulting incapacity of representatives to meet 
(examples include—inter alia—the International Exchange Service 1886-1939, the International 
Institute of Commerce, 1919-43, and the International Commission on Teaching of Mathematics,1908-
                                                     
23 In 1948, BIS returned 3.7 tonnes of looted gold it had received during the war as interest payments from the German 
Reichsbank to the Allied Tripartite Commission, and the ‘Liquidation Resolution’ was set aside. Financial Times, July 13, 
2013-https://www.ft.com/content/43fa3cdc-f934-11e2-86e1-00144feabdc0. 
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39. See Reinalda 2009:93; Howson 1984). Financial autonomy presents an important topic for future 
study. 
International Copyright Organization, 1952-1971 
In contrast to the BIS which survived in a hostile geopolitical environment seemingly ‘against the odds’, 
my final case, the International Copyright Organization (ICO), exemplifies an ‘unlikely death’. With a 
membership of 13 countries spanning four continents, dealing with a relatively ‘low-politics’ matter, 
and operating during a period of low global power-volatility, the ICO statistically had good survival 
chances. Yet closer examination places the ICO at the heart of an impending struggle for a New 
International Economic Order which soon made it untenable (Drahos 2002). 
The ICO was founded by Art.11 of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCU) in 1952. The UCU 
was developed by UNESCO as an alternative to the existing international copyright convention (Berne 
Convention of 1886) which was seen by many developing countries to privilege Western, developed, 
copyright-exporting nations, and also failed to include the US and many Latin-American countries. 
Developing nations’ discontent with prevailing international copyright governance was apparent at the 
1952 Geneva Conference which adopted the UCC, but the push for specific provisions in their favour 
only gained momentum through a series of conferences during the 1960s (Olian 1974:96; Bannerman 
2011). One was the African Study Meeting on Copyright held at Brazzaville in 1963, which concluded 
that “international copyright conventions are designed, in their present form, to meet the needs of 
countries which are exporters of intellectual works; these conventions…require review in the light of 
the specific needs of the African continent”.24  
The Brazzaville declaration illustrates the growing power struggle surrounding the international 
copyright system which was built and held together by imperial power (Bannerman 2011). The system 
had been shaped by the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Germany which housed major 
publishers, publishing in foreign countries. By contrast, developing countries were net copyright 
importers, dependent on foreign literature. During the 1960s, developing countries strongly urged 
revision of the system to satisfy their need for ready access to educational, scientific and technical 
knowledge, and to encourage the development of local publishing industries to reduce reliance on 
foreign works (Olian 1943:89).  
In 1967 the Stockholm Intellectual Property Conference convened to consider reforms to the Berne 
Convention. A strong factor behind the drive for reform was a growing sense of rivalry between the 
UCC and Berne Convention frameworks which competed for legitimacy and new members (Olian 
1943:81). The Stockholm conference agreed a Protocol Regarding Developing Countries which entitled 
developing members to enter reservations to certain terms of copyright protection for a 10 year period, 
widening rights of translation and reproduction and restricting copyright where a work was to be used 
for educational purposes. 25 Yet, this failed to solve the conflict. For developed countries, the Protocol 
represented a threat to copyright governance as it had evolved over the past century, and a confiscation 
of the rights of individual copyright-holders, and many refrained from signing it (Olian 1943:102). For 
developing countries it did not go far enough. At the same time, the UCC was not seen as a satisfactory 
alternative given that it contained insufficient provisions for reducing royalty payments or for providing 
financial assistance to developing countries to meet such obligations (Bannerman 2011). 
To resolve the impasse, two diplomatic conferences were held in 1971 aimed at revising both the 
Berne Convention and the UCU and thereby prevent a break-up of the international copyright system 
(Bannerman 2011). The result was the creation of the new World Intellectual Property Organization 
                                                     
24 Preamble to the recommendations adopted by the Brazzaville Conference, August 10, 1963 as quoted in Olian 1943:95.  
25 Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, 1967,vol.1. 
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(WIPO) which took over management of both the revised conventions.26 Organizationally WIPO 
inherited the structure and assets of the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property which had administered the Berne Convention since 1893 whereas the smaller and recently 
established ICO was dissolved.  
The ICO fits the profile of a relatively smaller ‘late-comer’ IGO which, although it dealt with a 
relatively ‘low-political’ technical and socio-economic matter, failed to take root due to growing 
distributive conflict and politization of copyright governance after decolonization. While the ICO 
terminated the revised UCC remains in force to this day with 84 contracting parties administered by 
WIPO. 
Summary and Conclusions 
My analysis of IGO death has illustrated the need to integrate explanations focused on exogenous 
geopolitical change with an account of the role of endogenous institutional factors. Wars and economic 
depressions do kill IGOs, but they do not endanger all IGOs equally. Intrinsic features such as 
organizational function, autonomy, size, and age can enhance or diminish IGOs’ ability to cope with a 
turbulent environment. My analysis also shows that organizational survival often owes a great deal to 
the timing and sequencing of institution-building efforts—a dimension that might remain hidden from 
view if studying only enduring IGOs, as has been the standard practice. 
Given that IGO death remains an understudied phenomenon about which few generally established 
facts are known I have chosen to combine population-wide statistical analysis with individual case 
studies in order to establish a firm empirical ground for my analysis. While both my statistical findings 
and case studies support my theoretical conjectures regarding the role(s) of exogenous shocks and 
intrinsic ‘robustness determining’ factors, the four case studies also illustrate the diverse paths to IGO 
termination, and thereby underscore the difficulty of formulating a single ‘grand theory’ of IGO death. 
By providing a longitudinal view of individual organizational trajectories, the case-studies highlight that 
an IGO with a certain general profile may be robust in the sense that is immune to the impact of most 
stresses, yet be highly vulnerable to one specific disturbance (Young 2010:6). This was the case, for 
example, with Danube Commission which survived numerous bouts of armed conflict between member 
states before finally succumbing to Europe’s Cold War Division. A similar story can be told about the 
International Commission of the Cape Spartel Light in Tangier (f.1865) which emerged unscathed from 
two world wars during which its members fought on opposite sides before quickly unravelling in 1958 
as a result of Moroccan independence. Historians might insist that the specific circumstances 
surrounding each IGO death renders it unique and not subject to general explanation. But although 
individual paths to IGO termination vary, population-wide analysis reveals clear historical patterns and 
regularities. Throughout the past two centuries, IGOs that have succumbed to exogenous shock have 
been on average smaller, newer and provided narrower functions than surviving counterparts. 
Combining statistical analysis and historical case-studies has thus allowed me to draw a distinction 
between proximate and underlying causes of IGO death: while proximate causes often appear unique, 
population-wide analysis reveals underlying structural features which make some IGOs generally more 
vulnerable to termination than others.  
While they reveal clear patterns and regularities in the histories of IGOs deaths, my findings also 
suggest that rather than having a single dominant cause, most IGO terminations involve multiple causes. 
Individually, these causes (or ‘risk-factors’) may be neither necessary nor sufficient, but work in 
combination to produce the outcome of organizational death (Mahoney 2008:7, 13). Furthermore, 
different combinations of risk-factors may result in the same outcome (‘equifinality’). Thus, one IGO 
                                                     
26 Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, UNESCO House, Paris, 5-24 July 1971; 
Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, Paris, 24 July 1971. 
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may succumb to environmental change due having a security focus combined with a narrow membership 
base, whereas another is vulnerable due its late-comer status. The causal significance of several risk 
factors and of different combinations of risk-factors presents a challenge for theory building. 
Equifinality however, does not imply that IGO deaths are ‘random’ and beyond general explanation. 
Rather, the challenge is to identify and determine the relative importance and empirical bounds of 
different causal drivers. For example, my empirical analysis has shown that while intrinsic factors such 
as the scope of an IGO’s mandate, the size of its membership or its degree of centralization may not 
matter greatly for its survivability during periods of rapid geopolitical change, these factors become 
causally more significant during relatively settled periods, when the efficiency gains afforded by IGOs 
rich on ‘general assets’ may give reason for states to keep them alive, or when having a broad mandate 
may allow an IGO to gradually adapt its activities to slow-moving forms of exogenous change. 
This finding may seem to indicate that the historical development of the IGO population conforms 
to a standard ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model whereby institutional change occurs through sequences of 
relative continuity and stability, ‘punctuated’ by major crises which rapidly undermine existing 
institutions (Fioretos 2017). During the former periods, low environmental volatility allows IGOs to 
entrench themselves securely in their environments through various processes of positive feedback, 
whereas during the latter periods, sudden shifts in state power or interests cause existing institutions to 
become dislodged. While partially accurate this explanation is, however, incomplete. As Fioretos (2017) 
argues, the model of discontinuous change associated with most punctuated equilibrium models risks 
masking important continuities in institutions across ruptures. Only by paying close attention to long-
term processes of institutional ‘lock-in’ and path-dependence can we explain why some IGOs terminate 
during crises while others remain in place, growing still more durable and shock-resistant over time.  
Conclusions  
IGO deaths have been a regular feature of international politics during the past two centuries. Yet there 
have been few scholarly attempts at explaining their causes. Instead it has been common wisdom among 
IR scholars that ‘IGOs rarely die’. Not surprisingly, historical analysis reveals that IGOs are neither as 
ephemeral as some early realist accounts suggested (e.g. Mearsheimer 1990), nor are they ‘unable to 
die’ (Strange 1998; Bernholz 2009). While some IGOs have endured for centuries, others have buckled 
quickly under various endogenous and exogenous strain. My aim in this article has been to offer a 
theoretical and empirical foundation for explaining IGO death. Careful identification of the processes 
that undermine IGOs can help to explain historical failures of international cooperation. At the same 
time, the population of defunct IGOs provides a rich source of historical data against which theoretical 
assumptions about ‘institutional robustness’ can be systematically tested. This may lead us to reassess 
prominent theories of institutional endurance and may reveal new outcomes of interest, thereby offering 
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Appendix and Codebook 
Table 1.  COX Proportional Hazard Analysis27  
Number of Member States Termination Risk 
















General Purpose -0.823* 
(0.494) 
Task-Specific (Judicial) 0.578 
(0.623) 
Task-Specific (Security) 0.260 
(0.251) 
Task-Specific (Social) -0.311* 
(0.182) 
Task-Specific (Techical) -0.507** 
(0.239) 
Membership Form  
Geographically restricted -2.968*** 
(0.568) 
Purpose restricted -2.319*** 
(0.556) 
Scope 






No. observations 553 
R2 0.200 
Max. Possible R2 0.989 
Log Likelihood -1,187.559 
Wald Test (df = 17) 88.400*** 
LR Test (df = 17) 123.353*** 
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 
17) 
96.266*** 
Note: Statistical significance *p<.10, **p<.05. ***p<.01 
                                                     
27 Model based on DIGO-1.0, 2018. 
28 The overall co-efficient for regional (compared to global) IGOs is: ‘AnyRegion’ 1.672*** 
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Fig. 3.  Hazard-Rates Over Time29  
 
Tables 4 and 5 are available as excel spreadsheets 
The Codebook is available from the author upon request.
                                                     
29
 Model based on data in DIGO-1.0. 2018. 
